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BOOK REVIEWS
AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW. By Robert A. Leflar. Indianapolis:
Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., 1968. Pp. lxxvi, 677. $19.50.
This volume is a revision of the 1959 edition and appears to be
designed primarily for the student.' It is from that viewpoint that this
review is written. The treatise is a comprehensive review of the
troublesome and confusing subject of conflict of laws. Some parts are
excellent, but others are so marred by inaccuracies and inadequacies
that the balance weighs heavily against its general usefulness.
For the student, the principal benefits will flow from Chapter 10,
"Choice-of-Law Theories," and Chapter 11, "Choice-Influencing
Considerations." In these two chapters, covering little more than 60
pages, the author has brought into focus the historic developments of
the past 40 years. There is a complete, but succinct, survey of Beale's
work and the provisions of Restatement I; the criticisms and
contributions of Cook and Lorenzen; the recent developments
principally associated with Currie, Ehrenzweig and Cavers; and the
tribulations of the proposed Restatement II. These chapters should be
required reading for all new conflicts students to whom this historic
process is unknown, these names meaningless, and the subject matter
an esoteric mystery expressed in incomprehensible jargon
Unfortunately the remainder of the volume does not measure up
to the standards of Chapters 10 and 11. There are two instances
where the text cites opinions of a California intermediate appellate
court, although the decisions of that court were vacated by hearing
and subsequent decisions by the California Supreme Court In one
instance this fact is noted, but in the other it is not, and the
superseded opinion is cited as law. This may be a minor matter to
some, but to one reared in the California tradition, once a hearing has
been granted after decision by the court of appeals, that court's
decision ceases to exist and may not be cited or used in any fashion.
I. Some copies have the words "Student Edition" embossed on the cover; however, the
text appears to be identical with those copies not so identified.
2. See Prosser, Interstate Publication, 51 MICH. L. REV.959, 971 (1953).
3. Myrick v. Superior Ct., 41 Cal. 2d 519, 256 P.2d 348 (1953) cited at 47 n.7 as
indicating that the opinion was affirmed by the California Supreme Court; Kubon v. Kubon,
323 P. 2d, 504 (1958) cited at 51 n. 10. This citation does not indicate subsequent hearing by and
decision in the California Supreme Court in 51 Cal. 2d 229, 331 P.2d 636 (1958).
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The leading cases of the past two decades on the subject of
judicial jurisdiction receive superficial treatment that is more likely to
hinder than help the student. Hanson v. Denckla' is one such case.
The author suggests (p. 87 n.16) that it marked the outer limits of
judicial power to adjudicate and identified their approximate location,
but there is no discussion in the text as to what those outer limits
might be or how their approximate location is to be determined.
There is no mention of the fact that the decision was by a Court
divided five to four, or that it is by no means clear that it was
correctly decided or is likely to be followed in the future. The result is
the creation of a false air of simplicity and certainty on a complex
and uncertain matter.
Another such case is Atkinson v. Superior Court.5 The end result
of that decision is overstated by the assertion: "The holding was that
the trust could be set aside without the trustee being before the court"
(p. 96 n.5). In fact, the sole issue before the California Supreme
Court in that case (an application for a writ of mandate to the trial
court) was whether the trial court, pending trial of the action on the
merits, had the power to grant a preliminary injunction or appoint a
receiver to prevent or hold future payments being made by California
employers to a New York trustee. There was no issue then before the
court of power over property already in the possession of the trustee,
of power over the trustee with respect to what he had done or might
do with property that had already come into his possession, or of the
validity of the trust itself.
In the treatment of consent or submission to jurisdiction by
agreement in advance, there is no discussion of the requirement of
actual notice (pp. 47-50). The implication from the text is that a
person may consent to suit in a specified state and may waive
personal service by appointing an agent in that state for such service
(p. 47 nn.4 & 5); nothing is said about notice to the defendant. While
National Equipment Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent6 is cited (p. 47 n.5), the
text does not call attention to the language of the majority opinion
that actual notice of the proceedings was given the defendants in time
for their appearance, and that such "adequate and timely notice . ..
[was] a prerequisite to a valid judgment." 7
The discussion of section 1404(a) of Title 28 of the Judicial Code
4. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
5. 49 Cal. 2d 338, 316 P.2d 960 (1957).
6. 375 U.S. 311 (1964).
7. Id. at 317-18.
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(p. 114) contains a serious inaccuracy. It is there stated: "Under the
well known section 1404(a), a federal district court may transfer a
case to the docket of any other federal district court in the United
States, where the case may be tried without new service" 8 (p. 114
n.14). This, of course, is not the law. Although there is a strong
movement to amend the section to provide for such freedom in
transfer of cases, the section still contains the limitation that transfer
of a pending action can be only to the "district or division where it
might have been brought." This limitation is not considered until
page 160, where the correct version is given (p. 160 n. 1).
The discussion of the effect of transfers under section 1404(a) on
the application of the Erie doctrineP is incomplete (p. 160). The
problem, simply stated, is whether in a 1404(a) transfer, the case
remains a transferor court case for purposes of Erie, or whether it
becomes a transferee court case for that purpose. The author cites
Van Dusen v. Barrack'" and tersely states: "The answer is now clear,
at least for most situations. It is the law of the state in which the case
was originally and properly filed" (p. 162 n. 12). Two sentences from
the opinion are then quoted, and the text continues: "There may be
exceptions to this rule, but none have yet been pointed out." There
are four things wrong with this treatment. First, the use of the adverb
"properly" in the text statement, without explanation, creates a
serious ambiguity. Does the author mean "properly" in the sense of
complying with court rules and payment of filing fees, or does he
mean "properly" in the sense of a proper venue? This is crucial to an
understanding of the problem. Second, there is an omission of the
qualifying language in the Court's opinion:
[W]e do not and need not consider whether in all cases § 1404(a) would require
the application of the law of the transferor, as opposed to the transferee, State.
We do not attempt to deterniine whether, for example, the same considerations
would govern if a plaintiff sought transfer under § 1404(a) or if it was contended
that the transferor State would simply have dismissed the action on the ground
of forum non conveniens."1
Third, in view of this qualifying language, the answer is not clear
for many situations, and fourth, two possible exceptions to the stated
rule have been suggested in the Supreme Court's opinion.
The Erie doctrine12 is inadequately treated. The implications in
8. Emphasis added.
9. See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
10. 376 U.S. 612 (1964).
I. Id. at 639-40.
12. See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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the text (pp. 150-56) are that Erie is applicable only when the case
comes to the federal court by reason of diversity jurisdiction. Later,
the text is confusing as to whether the applicability of Erie is
determined from the source of the federal court's jurisdiction,
diversity or subject matter, or from the nature of the particular issue
as based on a state or a federal source. 3 This confusion continues as
the Erie doctrine is discussed in connection with two other
matters-recognition of foreign judgments and forum non conveniens
in federal court diversity cases.
On the recognition of judgments of foreign courts, the author
asserts that the "Erie rule compels federal courts to follow state law
so that state rejection of retaliation against foreign judgments
becomes binding in federal courts"' 4 (p. 172 n.6). The only case cited
is a district court opinion; 5 a leading article suggesting that the
contrary rule should prevail is unmentioned. However, elsewhere in
the text, it is suggested, as a possibility, that the recognition of foreign
judgments could become a matter of federal common law, and thus
binding upon the states (pp. 173-74). In view of other decisions
dealing With Erie and federal issues in international matters, 7
decisions which are discussed elsewhere in the text (pp. 156-58, 174-
76), it would seem clear that the recognition of foreign judgments is a
federal matter on which the states would be bound to follow federal
law.
On forum non conveniens in federal courts, the text states:
It seems that the spirit of Erie and Klaxon would not be violated by holding
that access to the federal forum is wholly a matter for federal law. In the rare
case in which transfer to another federal court under § 1404(a) is not possible,
so that dismissal for forum non conveniens reasons is the only relief that can be
requested, a federal court can usually formulate its own test for dismissal as
easily as it can ascertain the state test (p. 151)."1
The result stated seems sound, but the reason given for it is strange
and gives a distorted picture of the rationale for the Erie doctrine. It
has never been suggested that the test for the application of Erie is the
relative ease with which a federal rule can be formulated or a state
13. CJ. F. JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE 36 n. 1 (1965). One of the most significant and penetrating
discussions of this problem, the dissenting opinion in Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 653
(1963), is not mentioned.
14. Emphasis added.
15. Svenska Handelsbanken v. Carlson, 258 F. Supp. 448 (D. Mass. 1966).
16. Reese, The Status in this Country of Judgments Rendered Abroad, 50 COLutM. L.
REV. 783, 787-88 (1950).




rule ascertained. The true basis for a federal rule on fbrum non
conveniens is that it, the venue rules, and section 1404(a) all relate to
the matter of the distribution of business within the federal judical
system, and this is a matter for uniform federal determination without
regard to the rule of the particular state in which the district court is
sitting. 9
Another subject on which the treatment is unsatisfactory, is the
matter of constitutional limitations on the choice of law process. On
several occasions, it is suggested that there is a relationship between
the applicability of the due process clause in determining jurisdiction
over the person and in determining choice of law. On page 87, the
statement is made: "[]he outer limits of legislative jurisdiction
prescribed by such cases as Home Insurance Co. v. Dick are at least
relevant to the judicial jurisdiction problem. 20 On page 122 the text
reads:
Due process approval of modern "long-arm statutes" which permit state
courts to exercise judicial jurisdiction under the "fair play and substantial
justice" test runs parallel to the current approval of similar choice-of-law
freedom. Contacts sufficient to satisfy "fair play and substantial justice" for
judicial jurisdiction under the due process clause will often satisfy whatever test
(perhaps the same test) the same constitutional clause prescribes for legislative
jurisdiction. . . . The questions of what law may govern and what court may act
are similar though not the same. The lines that delineate the answers to the
question seem to be converging but they have not merged. 1
And finally, on page 135, the author states: "And there is the obvious
correlation between the constitutional limits on choice of law in these
'legislative jurisdiction' areas and those imposed by the due process
clause under the head of 'judicial jurisdiction.' "22
There are two faults with this discussion. One is that it ignores
the majority opinion in Hanson v. Denckla,2 3 which denied Florida the
power to adjudicate issues concerning absent trustees, but suggested
that Florida's interest was sufficient to justify application of Florida
law to the substantive issue involved. The Court's language was:
For the purpose of applying its rule that the validity of a trust is determined
by the law of the State of its creation, Florida ruled that the appointment
amounted to a "republication" of the original trust instrument in Florida. For
choice-of-law purposes such a ruling may be justified, but we think it an




23. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
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insubstantial connection with the trust agreement for purposes of determining the
question of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant 4
This is distinctly different from the text treatment, and failure to refer
to what is still the most recent Supreme Court expression gives a
distorted picture. The other fault is that the text has used four
different phrases to describe this purported relationship: "at least
relevant," "runs parallel," "similar though not the same," and
"obvious correlation." It would seem to one using words accurately,
that there is a substantial difference between the concept expressed in
the first two and the last two. When there is the added fact that
nowhere is there any analysis or discussion of the underlying rationale
for such relevance or correlation, the student might find this treatment
more confusing than helpful.
There is another phase of the due process clause and the choice-
of-law process that could have been clarified. The author, after
discussing Home Insurance Co. v. Dick,25 states: "No one suggests
that the Dick case is likely to be overruled" (p. 125). To set the
record straight, one authority has written that reliance on the Dick
case is "highly dubious."2 However, the majority view, which
includes the Supreme Court, is in accord with the text, and, had it
been noted that the Court has cited Dick with approval in two
comparatively recent decisions,27 the present status of that case would
have been portrayed more accurately.
With respect of the full faith and credit clause and the choice-of-
law process, Hughes v. Fetter 8 receives far less than satisfactory
treatment. The text states: "The case that sets a pattern for full faith
and credit compulsion based altogether on the 'public acts' part of the
clause and statute is Hughes v. Fetter" (p. 199). The trenchant
criticism of Currie and Schreter, 29 and the Supreme Court's own
qualification of that decision in the subsequent case of Wells v.
Simonds Abrasive Co.,." would seem to have placed Hughes v. Fetter
in the category of an equal protection limitation and not a full faith
and credit command. None of these subsequent matters is mentioned.
24. Id. at 253.
25. 281 U.S. 397 (1930).
26. A. EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICT OF LAWS 142 n.8 (1959).
27. Clay v. Sun Ins. Office Ltd., 377 U.S. 179, 181-82 (1964); Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376
U.S. 612, 639 n.41 (1964).
28. 341 U.S. 609 (1951).
29. Currie & Schreter, Unconstitutional Discrimination in the Conflict of Laws: Equal
Protection, 28 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 45 (1960); Currie, The Constitution and the "Transitory"
Cause of Action, 73 HARV. L. REv. 36, 268 (1959).
30. 345 U.S. 514, 518 (1953).
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There are other matters that pervade the volume and detract
from the value of this work. One is the same frequent resort to
Arkansas references that limited the scope of the earlier edition. An
example is the discussion of usury (p. 379 n.4); while it might have
been desirable to select cases from a single state to illustrate a point,
Arkansas is hardly a representative state. Some other examples may
be found in the discussion of full faith and credit application to state
judgments (p. 178), equitable defenses to actions on judgments (p.
190), choice-of-law provisions in workmen's compensation acts (p.
225 n.2), the characterization process (p. 210 n.3), and an apparently
peculiar rule on failure to serve process (p. 54 n. 13).
Finally, this volume badly needs re-editing. Many matters are
discussed several times at different places in the text and footnotes'
In some instances, repetition may be necessary because of relevance to
different problems, but in such cases, the discussion should be
consistent and the language reasonably consistent. As previously
mentioned, this is not always the caseW 2 In at least one instance, the
repetition is inexcusable (pp. 243 n.l. 259 n.1).
This has not been a pleasant review to write. Many of us who
teach in this field would welcome the opportunity to refer our stu-
dents unqualifiedly to a treatise that would be reliable and helpful. I am
afraid the present volume will not serve that purpose.
JOHN A. GORFINKEL*
31. See, e.g., text accompanying notes 8-I1, 18-19 supra.
32. See text accompanying note 20 supra.
* Dean, School of Law, Golden Gate College.
THE POLICY-MAKING PROCESS. By Charles E. Lindblom. Englewood
Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc. 1968. Pp. 122. $4.95 (Cloth), $1.95 (Paper).
Dr. Lindblom, who is Professor of Political Science and Economics
at Yale University, has written a brief but comprehensive work on the
vitally important and widely misunderstood subject of policy-making.
The book is presented as part of The Foundations of Modern
Political Science Series, which seeks "to shorten by a decade or
more" the task of molding the knowledge of political science into
"highly readable" form. Perhaps it would be going too far to claim
that such an auspicious accomplishment has been achieved by
Lindblom's slim volume, but the work should definitely prove
1969] 1015
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worthwhile reading for students and members of the general
community who are interested in the factors which surround policy-
making. The comparatively modest price in paperback is fortunate
since it will facilitate distribution to the dwindling, but still sizeable,
fraction of the populace which has not concocted a procedure for
rendering its literature purchases tax deductible.
Members of the bar whose practice involves confronting agencies
and officials who make public policy owe it to themselves, and to
their clients, to familiarize themselves with the theories that are
outlined in this book. Legal scholarship has characteristically devoted
much attention to how the court system makes policy. Traditionally,
much of this work has consisted of studying the court system as an
arbiter of conflict between private parties. However, in modern times
a growing fraction of the civil lawyer's workload involves competition
between individuals, private institutions, and government.
Increasingly, government means the federal government. In many
areas of such practice, such as securities or food and drug law, the
lawyer has failed if he becomes involved in courtroom litigation,
regardless of its outcome. When he succeeds, it is through skillful
filing-cabinet practice. An understanding of what makes the White
House, the bureaucracy, and Congress reach policy determinations is
essential. These institutions, as Lindblom shows, do not ignore each
other when making policy. The lawyer must know how the action he
is requesting will effect this relationship. Is it the type of decision
which the authority in question can easily make, or will it require the
authority to go outside its usual area of specialization or influence?
What has been said above is really just an assertion that here, as
in most other areas, the lawyer can no longer think of himself as only
a specialist in legal doctrine-if indeed he ever really could. In our
society today, traditional occupations are fading. The policeman, the
minister, and even the merchant and the barber, as well as the lawyer,
no longer are allowed to perform narrow, well-defined functions.
Everyone'needs to be a generalist, at least in part. Consider, for
example, what has happened in the area of criminal law: it has
dissolved as an independent discipline to become interrelated with
psychiatry, genetics, education, race relations, and other fields. Today
no one can influence policy decisions in criminal law without affecting
policy in one or more of these other "disciplines." The same is
becoming true everywhere, and if lawyers act as though it were
otherwise, they, like witchdoctors, will probably lose their influence.
Even now they are tending to become obsolescent.
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Lindblom's analysis concentrates primarily on policy-making in
the federal government, though, as he notes, the same phenomena
certainly are present to varying degrees in local and in private
governments, such as the supercorporations. The role of "analysis"
or study in the policy-making pr6cess is discussed at length. Lindblom
then goes on to describe the devices that have been created for carving
up power, the need for these devices, and the regulation of various
delegations and divisions of power. This he terms the "play of
power." He discusses the roles of lobbyists, citizens, and elections.
Finally he considers the policy-maker as a preference creator, as
opposed to an arbiter among competing preferences.
That is a lot of ground to cover. Lindblom has accomplished the
task by drawing liberally from the writing of other scholars and
incorporating their observations into the broader picture. In respect to
each particular aspect of the process, footnotes indicate where the
reader may seek a more thorough discussion. The effect is to present
a great number of interesting points in sufficient detail to convey a
basic understanding and to stimulate the reader's further curiosity.
This is an excellent .accomplishment, but it leaves the reader still in
the dark as to what he may anticipate will happen to any particular
"policy" issue he might inject into the policy-making process. He is
told that some of a number of phenomena will come into play, but he
is not enlightened as to which are more likely to dominate in given
decision areas.
The problem is intimately related to the book's principal
mystery. Professor Lindblom undertakes to describe the process of
policy-making without ever defining the term "policy." Moreover, he
elects not to call this fact to the reader's attention by any express
device. This is noteworthy because in another instance he does call the
reader's attention, by way of a footnote, to the fact that "power" is
not and will not be defined. Did Lindblom remain silent on the
meaning of "policy" because he believed that his readers would know
and agree as to what he meant by "policy?" That is hardly likely, for
if policy had a precisely definable meaning, to assume that readers
know it would be inconsistent with the book's goal of popularizing.
Many things that are more obvious are explained in abundant detail.
In the case of "power," Lindblom asserts that its meaning will
become more clear as the discussion progresses. Perhaps he intends
the same to be true regarding policy. That would amount to saying
that policy is "no more than that which is made by the process I am
about to describe." This is a possible explanation-in fact one
19691
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suggested by the book's dustcover advertising-but if so, it would
then render the book trivial. There are decisions which "count," to
use Lindblom's word. The fact that they do not emerge from a system
just described does not mean there is no policy; it just indicates that
you looked at the wrong process.
What is "policy?" Certainly it is not readily susceptible of
credible definition. One need look no further than the inconclusive
terms the dictionary contains on the subject. Perhaps it would be best
to concede that "policy" is an ambiguous term which we apply to
many categories of decisions or choices. The analyst's task then
requires that he decide what types of decisions are the ones that count
heavily. Suppose that after many professors have written books,
foundations have sponsored studies, bureaucrats have delegated and
cooperated, a commission has reported, and congressional committees
have investigated, the President appears on nation-wide television. He
announces that his administration has reached a determination that
business conglomerates are undesirable and that they will be cut down
to size. Has the administration established a policy? What if the next
day the President sends Congress a budget asking for 1000 dollars to
control conglomerates. If you were counsel for a conglomerate would
you not feel that the administration's policy was to do nothing to
control conglomerates? It is not at all clear that the process which led
to the television policy and that which led to the budget request were
the same. One would not want to spend much time on the first if the
two processes are in fact different. This is why it is valuable to
identify which decisions count before analyzing how they evolved.
Who knows, it may be that whole branches of our federal government
engage in processes that do not count at all.
In some respects, The Policy-Making Process is an expansion of
Lindblom's thesis in his famous article, "The Science of 'Muddling
Through,' " and something of a precis of ideas contained in such
previous books as The Intelligence of Democracy; Politics,
Economics, and Welfare; and A Strategy of Decision. The essential
message of the article, and of the book under review, is that policy-
making in American government cannot be reduced for descriptive or
analytical purposes to a neat formula or to one model. Although he
fails to define the word "policy," it is evident that he thinks of it as
the outcome of a process of decision-making, not as an input. It
should be noted that lawyers often think of the "policy" aspects of a
given decision, say of the Supreme Court, but when doing so they are
looking to policy as an input. Policy as outcome is simply too
complex for Professor Lindblom to find general principles.
[VOL. 22
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But quite obviously this will not do. Lawyers, as well as political
scientists, economists, and others, need to be able to understand how
public policies are made if they are to do their jobs effectively.
Furthermore, some idea of policy-making is vitally necessary in legal
education. How, for example, can Constitutional Law, Administrative
Law, Labor Law, or Corporations be taught without some adequate
appreciation of policy-making? They cannot, simply because the name
of the game in many of the substantive areas of those courses is policy
making.
But the usual fodder served up in the nation's law schools, in the
usual casebooks or coursebooks, simply does not give the necessary
insights into the process. For that matter, the very term, "policy," is
often used and seldom defined in legal literature. Clearly, it is, as has
been said, a term of multiple reference; it can be the outcomes of
decisional processes, or it can be one of the inputs into those same
processes. Legal scholars have not as yet produced the systematic and
comprehensive studies of policy that are needed to provide greater
understanding of the legal process.
The value of this volume and of other works on policy-making is
that attention is directed toward more than the judicial review aspects
of the public administration. For students of that amorphous bag of
high-level abstractions called "administrative law," Lindblom's book
should be required reading. It will not fill the gaps left by casebook
treatment of the public administration, but it will help.
ARTHUR SELWYN MILLER*
BRUCE L. MCDONALD**
* Professor of Law, The George Washington University.
** Member of the District of Columbia bar; LL.M. Candidate, The George Washington
University.
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